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THE BUTTERFLY EFFECT 
IN BOILERPLATE CONTRACT 
INTERPRETATION 
JOHN F. COYLE* 
I 
INTRODUCTION
Legal disputes relating to contract interpretation are frequently
conceptualized as one-and-done affairs. A court will adopt what it considers to 
be a reasonable interpretation of the contract, rule in favor of one of the parties, 
and decide the case. Neither the judge nor the litigants tend to think overmuch
about how the decision will affect other contract users going forward. In cases 
where the language being interpreted is contract boilerplate, however, past
interpretive decisions will inevitably affect future ones. Just as a butterfly 
flapping its wings in Tokyo can change the weather in London, so too can a 
judicial decision interpreting boilerplate language alter the meaning of identical 
language in thousands of other contracts. To speak of the “butterfly effect” in
contract interpretation, therefore, is to describe the effect that a single 
interpretive decision can have on the interests of far-flung parties not involved in 
the litigation at hand.1 
This special issue of Law and Contemporary Problems is devoted to exploring
the butterfly effect in boilerplate contract interpretation.2 This short essay 
introducing the volume has two objectives. First, it provides a general
introduction to the butterfly effect and explains, conceptually, why it is useful to
think about boilerplate contract interpretation through this particular lens.
Second, it provides summaries of the other articles in the special issue, each of 
which sheds important light on the workings of the butterfly effect. These
contributions, it is hoped, will prove useful to future scholars, judges, and
Copyright © 2019 by John F. Coyle. 
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* Reef C. Ivey II Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.  Special 
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1.  The butterfly effect is sometimes described as “a component of chaos theory that focuses on the 
sensitivity of complex systems to small disturbances.” Jill Fisch & Eric Roiter, A Floating NAV for Money 
Market Funds: Fix or Fantasy?, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1003, 1031 n.197 (2012). In this essay, the term is 
used to describe how a single judicial decision interpreting contract boilerplate can reshape the meaning
of tens of thousands of contracts that contain identical language. 
2.  This is not the first collection of essays to grapple with the interpretive challenges posed by
contract boilerplate. See, e.g., BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 143–86 (O. 
Ben-Shahar ed., 2009). 
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ii LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 82:i
legislatures grappling with the interpretive challenges posed by ambiguous 
contract boilerplate.
II
THE BUTTERFLY EFFECT EXPLAINED
To understand the significance of the butterfly effect, consider the following
scenario. A judge writes a decision assigning a specific meaning to an ambiguous 
word or phrase that appears in many thousands of contracts. Years later, a 
different set of parties find themselves involved in litigation implicating the same
ambiguous word or phrase. In this new litigation, the judge concludes that that
language should be interpreted in precisely the same manner as in the original 
case decided years before. In future years, other courts presented with the same
interpretive question hew closely to the decision rendered by the first two courts.
While this sort of thing happens all the time, it is important to recognize 
precisely what has transpired. The original interpretive decision recast the 
meaning of boilerplate language that appears in tens of thousands of existing 
agreements. This revision occurred without any input from the parties to these
other contracts before the fact and without any attempt to notify them of the 
change after the fact. This is the butterfly effect in boilerplate contract 
interpretation—the ability of a single interpretive decision to alter the meaning 
of identical language in thousands of other agreements in one fell swoop. 
The butterfly effect in neither good nor bad. It simply is. The effect can, 
however, generate positive or negative outcomes depending on the quality of the 
interpretive rule announced in the initial decision. As a general rule, the courts 
strive to interpret ambiguous contract language to effectuate the parties’ 
intentions. When the language at issue is contract boilerplate that was borrowed 
wholesale from a prior agreement, however, this task presents obvious 
challenges. Since the parties never discussed or negotiated this language, it is 
difficult to unearth any evidence of the specific intent of these particular parties.3 
In such circumstances, the court must shift gears. Rather than seeking to
determine the subjective intent of these particular contracting parties, the courts 
will instead seek to determine the objective intent of most contracting parties.4 
The courts will strive, in other words, to develop an interpretive rule that aligns 
with the preferences of most contract users.5 
3. See John F. Coyle & W. Mark. C. Weidemaier, Interpreting Contracts Without Context, 67 AM.
U. L. REV. 1673, 1678 (2018) (stating that accuracy as to the parties’ intent is “difficult or impossible”). 
4. See id. (“[E]ven when ostensibly concerned with subjective intent, courts tend to favor
evidentiary proxies that are objective in nature.”); see also Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 
N.A., 691 F.2d 1039, 1048 (2d Cir. 1982) (“Boilerplate provisions are . . . not the consequence of the
relationship of particular borrowers and lenders and do not depend upon particularized intentions of the
parties to an indenture.”). 
5. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of 
Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 971 (1983) (suggesting that efficient contract default rules 
are those that “most” bargainers would prefer).
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 iiiNo. 4 2019] THE BUTTERFLY EFFECT IN CONTRACT BOILERPLATE
When the courts succeed in crafting such a rule, the result is a net benefit for 
contract users. By interpreting boilerplate language in a manner that conforms to
majoritarian expectations, the court minimizes transaction costs because there is 
no need for contract users to redraft their existing contracts to “correct” an 
idiosyncratic interpretive decision.6 When contracts scholars speak about the 
network effects that flow from contract boilerplate having a “settled” meaning, 
they are implicitly referencing the advantages that flow from this positive
butterfly effect.7 
Occasionally, however, the interpretive machinery breaks down. In such 
cases, the first court to interpret an ambiguous boilerplate provision develops an
interpretive rule that is inconsistent with majoritarian expectations. This gives 
rise to the negative butterfly effect. Contract users must thereafter incur the costs
of either redrafting their agreements or convincing a subsequent court to ignore 
the prior decision in litigation.8 These costs are normatively undesirable. They 
are, however, the logical consequence of a phenomenon that assigns great 
significance to the first decision to construe a particular piece of boilerplate but 
that contains no mechanism for evaluating whether the interpretive rule
announced in the decision at hand is consistent with the preferences of most 
contract users. 
6. See Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
1581, 1581–84 (2005) (stating that the goal of contract interpretation is to reduce transaction costs). 
7. See Michelle Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH.
L. REV. 1105, 1112–14 (2006) (“If courts have fleshed out the application of language, a drafter can be
confident about its future application.”); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and 
Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 718–21
(1997) (discussing the “learning benefits” and “network benefits” parties see when using commonly used
language); Tal Kastner & Ethan J. Lieb, Contract Creep, 107 GEO. L.J. 1277, 1320 (2019) (“Standardized 
terms in homogenously sophisticated markets invite a particular doctrinal approach that recognizes the
efficiency of communicating fixed and reliable meaning.”); see also Kolbe v. BAC Home Loans Servicing,
LP, 738 F.3d 432, 440 (1st Cir. 2013) (“When a contract uses uniform language that is contained in a large
number of contracts, as is the case here, it is a well-established common law principle of contract 
interpretation that such contracts are ‘interpreted wherever reasonable as treating alike all those
similarly situated, without regard to their knowledge or understanding of the standard terms of the
writing.’”) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981)).
8. The negative butterfly effect is particularly pernicious in the context of consumer contracts. 
Where a court interprets a consumer contract in a manner that favors the company at the expense of the
consumer, the language will generally remain unchanged because the consumers are in no position to
negotiate a revision. When a court interprets a consumer contract in a manner that favors the consumer, 
however, the company is well positioned to revise the agreement so as to favor the interests of the
company. See David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 57
UCLA L. REV. 605, 608–09 (2010) (observing that consumers have little power in negotiating changes in
their contract terms); see also Robin Kar & Margaret Jane Radin, Pseudo-Contracts and Shared Meaning 
Analysis, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1135, 1164–65 (2019) (questioning whether certain boilerplate provisions
should be considered a part of consumer contracts). 
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iv LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 82:i
III
THE POSITIVE BUTTERFLY EFFECT: AN ILLUSTRATION
Boilerplate choice-of-law clauses regularly appear in commercial contracts.9 
One interpretive question that sometimes arises with respect to these clauses is 
whether language selecting the “laws” of a particular jurisdiction operates to also
select that jurisdiction’s conflict-of-laws rules.10 Most scholars have argued that 
these clauses should generally not be interpreted as choosing these rules. Since
the whole point of a choice-of-law clause is to provide certainty as to the
governing law, so the argument goes, it is unclear why anyone would want to 
select a body of rules that could lead to the application of the laws of a different 
jurisdiction. There are, however, a few scattered decisions in which courts have 
interpreted generic choice-of-law clauses to select the conflicts rules of the 
chosen jurisdiction.11 
In 2012, this interpretive question was put before the New York Court of 
Appeals.12 That court was asked to determine whether a choice-of-law clause 
selecting the “laws” of New York should be read to select that state’s conflicts 
rules.13 On the surface, the argument that the clause should be read to select these 
rules had a certain appeal. While many choice-of-law clauses contain language 
excluding the conflict-of-laws rules of the chosen state, this particular clause
lacked such language.14 This fact notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals 
unanimously held that the clause at issue should be read to exclude the chosen 
jurisdiction’s conflict-of-laws rules.15 In the court’s words:
It strains credulity that the parties would have chosen to leave the question of the 
applicable substantive law unanswered and would have desired a court to engage in a 
complicated conflict-of-laws analysis, delaying resolution of any dispute and increasing
litigation expenses. We therefore conclude that parties are not required to expressly
exclude New York conflict-of-laws principles in their choice-of-law provision in order
to avail themselves of New York substantive law. Indeed, in the event parties wish to
employ New York’s conflict-of-laws principles to determine the applicable substantive
law, they can expressly so designate in their contract.16 
9. See Julian Nyarko, We’ll See You in. . . Court!  The Lack of Arbitration Clauses in International
Commercial Contracts, 58 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 6, 11 (2018) (“[C]lauses that specify the governing law 
are very common, appearing in 75% of the contracts.”). 
10. See John F. Coyle, The Canons of Construction for Choice-of-Law Clauses, 92 WASH. L. REV.
631, 643–47 (2017) (discussing interpretive rules that the courts apply to resolve this question) 
[hereinafter Canons]. 
11. See, e.g., Duskin v. Pennsylvania-Central Airlines Corp. 167 F.2d 727, 732 (6th Cir. 1948) cert. 
denied, 335 U.S. 829 (1948) (applying the whole law of Pennsylvania); Carlos v. Philips Bus. Sys., Inc., 
556 F. Supp. 769, 774 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (applying the whole law of New York).
12.  IRB-Brasil Resseguros, S.A. v. Inepar Invs., S.A., 20 N.Y.3d 310 (2012). 
13. Id. at 312. 
14. See id. at 313 (stating that the agreement was to be “governed by, and . . . be construed in
accordance with, the laws of the State of New York.”). 
15. Id. at 316. 
16. Id. 
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The consensus among scholars, legal commentators, and contract users is that 
the interpretive rule announced by the New York Court of Appeals is, in fact, the 
one that is preferred by a majority of contract users.17 
In the years since this decision was rendered, the positive butterfly effect has 
ensured that other courts presented with similar choice-of-law clauses construed 
them in a similar manner. In 2017, the New York Supreme Court was presented
with a choice-of-law clause that “omit[ted] the words ‘without giving effect to any
conflict of law principles under New York law.’”18 Nevertheless, that court held 
that the “omission of the clause [was] of no moment because parties [were] not 
required to expressly exclude New York conflict-of-laws principles in their
choice-of-law provision in order to avail themselves of New York substantive 
law.”19 In 2018, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 
reached the same conclusion in a different case.20 In its decision, that court 
observed that New York “appear[ed] to treat as identical a choice-of-law 
provision designating New York law exclusive of New York conflict-of-law 
principles and a choice-of-law provision designating New York law without such 
an exclusion.”21 
These cases serve to highlight the positive butterfly effect. The New York 
Court of Appeals announced an interpretive rule for a standard piece of contract 
boilerplate that was consistent with majoritarian expectations. Other courts then
relied on that decision when interpreting other contracts containing similar 
language to produce outcomes that were likewise consistent with these 
expectations. This decision, happily, imposed no costs on other contract users 
because there was no need for them to redraft their choice-of-law clauses to 
correct for a judicial mistake.
IV 
THE NEGATIVE BUTTERFLY EFFECT: AN ILLUSTRATION
Forum selection clauses regularly appear in commercial agreements.22 A 
recurring issue relating to the interpretation of these clauses asks whether the
parties intended to resolve their dispute in (1) state court, (2) federal court, or 
17. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (“In the 
absence of a contrary indication of intention, the reference is to the local law of the state of the chosen
law.”); Coyle, Canons, supra note 10, at 688. (“It is difficult . . . to see why any contracting party would 
ever want to select the whole law of a jurisdiction to govern their agreement if the goal of the clause is to
reduce uncertainty and to ensure a uniform choice of law.”). 
18. Gottwald v. Sebert, No. 30521(U), slip op. at 8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 20, 2017). 
19. Id. (quoting IRB-Brasil Resseguros, S.A. v. Inepar Invs., S.A., 20 N.Y.3d 310, 316 (2012)) 
(punctuation error in original). 
20. In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., 299 F. Supp. 3d 430, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
21. Id.
 22. See Nyarko, supra note 9, at 11 (stating that forum selection clauses appeared in forty-four
percent of contracts in 2008). 
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vi LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 82:i
(3) either state or federal court.23 Over the years, the courts have developed a
number of interpretive rules to help them answer this question. One such rule 
was announced by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 1992.24 
In Milk ‘N’ More, Inc. v. Beavert, that court was asked to determine whether 
a defendant had waived his right to remove a case to federal court when he agreed 
to a forum selection clause stating that “venue shall be proper under this 
agreement in Johnson County, Kansas.”25 The court began its inquiry by noting 
that the issue presented was “basically one of contract interpretation.”26 The
court’s subsequent interpretive analysis, however, left much to be desired. The 
court first offered the conclusory observation that the wording of the forum 
selection clause “strongly point[ed] to the state courts of that county.”27 It then 
observed that a federal district court in Colorado had previously interpreted a 
similarly-worded clause to require litigation in state court.28 On the basis of these 
two observations—and nothing else—the Tenth Circuit held that the forum 
selection clause at issue precluded removal to federal court. The court did not 
explain why the language in the clause “clear[ly] and unequivocal[ly]” waived the 
right to remove.29 Nor did it explain why the canon requiring ambiguous contract 
language to be construed against the drafter was inapplicable.30 The court simply
announced a new interpretive rule—forum selection clauses that select a county 
as the venue constitute a waiver of the right to remove to federal court—and 
applied it to the contract.
The years have not been kind to this rule. To date, every other federal circuit 
to have considered it has rejected it.31 The Fifth Circuit has been particularly
pointed in its criticism.32 Surveys of practicing attorneys, moreover, indicate that 
this rule does a poor job of effectuating the intent of most contracting parties who 
23. See John F. Coyle, Interpreting Forum Selection Clauses, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1791, 1826–30 (2019) 
(discussing canons of construction affecting the interpretation of forum selection clauses) [hereinafter
Interpreting].
24.  Milk ‘N’ More, Inc. v. Beavert, 963 F.2d 1342 (10th Cir. 1992). 
25. Id. at 1345–46. 
26. Id. at 1345
 27. Id. at 1346. 
28. Id. (citing Intermountain Sys., Inc. v. Edsall Constr. Co., 575 F. Supp. 1195, 1198 (D. Colo. 
1983)). 
29. Id.
 30. Id.
 31. See Simonoff v. Expedia, Inc., 643 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that when a forum 
selection clause specifies a county, venue is proper in state or federal court); All. Health Grp. LLC v. 
Bridging Health Options LLC, 553 F.3d 397, 400–01 (5th Cir. 2008) (rejecting a party’s assertion that a 
forum selection clause specifying a county only included state courts); Global Satellite Commc’n Co. v.
Starmill U.K. Ltd., 378 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that venue was appropriate in either
state or federal court when the forum selection clause specified a county). 
32. See All. Health Grp. LLC, 553 F.3d at 401 (“[I]t can hardly be said that a reference to ‘county’ 
clearly suggests the Harrison County Circuit Court rather than the United States District Court when it 
has a courthouse in, and jurisdiction over, Harrison County.”).
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 vii No. 4 2019] THE BUTTERFLY EFFECT IN CONTRACT BOILERPLATE
draft forum selection clauses.33 Nevertheless, the rule continues to be applied by
the Tenth Circuit and the district courts within it.34 Having concluded—albeit in 
a conclusory and slapdash fashion—that this contract language has a particular
meaning, the Tenth Circuit now views the issue as settled. Any and all future
forum selection clauses with similar language that come before the court will be
interpreted in the same way. 
The consequences of this commitment are illustrated by Excell, Inc. v. Sterling 
Boiler & Mechanical, Inc., a case decided by the Tenth Circuit in 1997.35 Sterling 
Boiler & Mechanical, Inc. was named as defendant in a breach of contract action
filed in Colorado state court.36 The company wanted to remove the case to federal 
court but had previously agreed to a forum selection clause that stated that 
“venue shall lie in the County of El Paso, Colorado.”37 The company’s attorneys 
tried desperately to persuade the Tenth Circuit that it had never intended to
waive its right to remove. They submitted an affidavit signed by the Sterling
Boiler employee who had negotiated the contract stating that he understood the 
clause to permit suit to be brought in either state or federal court.38 They argued
that the clause was ambiguous and should therefore be construed against the
party that had drafted it.39 They argued that any waiver of one’s right to remove
to federal court must be “clear and unequivocal[,]” and that the language in the
contract did not meet this standard.40 They pointed out that the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Colorado encompassed all of Colorado, including El 
Paso County.41 They did everything they could, in short, to persuade the court 
that their intent was different than the litigants in the prior case, even though 
their forum selection clause looked a great deal like the clause in that case.
Their efforts proved unavailing. The Tenth Circuit, citing its prior decision,
held that the clause clearly and unequivocally evidenced the parties’ intent to 
litigate their disputes in state court.42 To add insult to injury, the court ordered
Sterling Boiler to pay the other party’s legal fees because it had “little to no basis 
for seeking removal.”43 The court held, in essence, that Sterling Boiler was 
33. See Coyle, Interpreting, supra note 23, at 1847–50 (observing that most drafters prefer to
“preserve the option of going to federal court.”). 
34. See Triple “S” Operating Co., LLC v. Ezpawn Okla., Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65524, at *12
(N.D. Okla. June 30, 2010) (holding that a forum selection clause specifying a county waives the parties’ 
rights to remove to federal court).
35.  Excell, Inc. v. Sterling Boiler & Mech., Inc., 106 F.3d 318, 321 (10th Cir. 1997). 
36. Id. at 320. 
37. Id.
38. Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Remand to State Court at 6, Excell, Inc. v.
Sterling Boiler & Mech., Inc., 916 F. Supp. 1063 (D. Colo. 1996) (No. 95-B-3030). 
39. Opening Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 9, Excell, Inc. v. Sterling Boiler & Mechanical, Inc., 
106 F.3d 318 (10th Cir. 1997) (No. 96–1090). 
40. Id.
41.  Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Remand to State Court, supra note 38, at 3.
 42. Excell, 106 F.3d at 321. 
43. Id. at 322. 
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viii LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 82:i
wasting everyone’s time. The Tenth Circuit had already decided what these 
words meant. If the parties had wanted a different result, they should have used 
different words. 
This case serves to highlight the negative butterfly effect.44 The Tenth Circuit 
announced an interpretive rule that was arguably inconsistent with majoritarian
expectations. That court then relied on that rule in a subsequent case containing 
similar language to produce a decision that was similarly inconsistent with these
expectations. Significantly, it did so notwithstanding a barrage of evidence that 
would have supported a contrary outcome. As a consequence of this decision,
contracting parties in the Tenth Circuit must now incur the drafting costs of
rewriting their agreements or, alternatively, incur the litigation costs of seeking 
to persuade future court to set aside this particular interpretive rule. 
V 
ACCENTUATING THE POSITIVE
In light of the foregoing discussion, the question that naturally arises is what, 
if anything, the courts can do to maximize the likelihood that their readings of 
ambiguous contract boilerplate align with majoritarian expectations in the first 
instance. Put differently, how can the courts maximize the chances that their 
interpretive rules reflect the preferences of most contract users? 
While there are several strategies that the courts might consider, they all 
derive from the same basic insight—judicial decisions interpreting contract 
boilerplate have third-party effects. In order to ensure that these effects are 
positive rather than negative, the courts should actively solicit input from neutral 
third parties whenever they are called upon to interpret contract boilerplate for 
the first time.45 They should not simply rely on the representations of the litigants 
44. Another example of the negative butterfly effect can be found in litigation relating to the 
meaning of the pari passu clause in sovereign debt agreements. In 2000, a court in Belgium ruled that this 
clause “meant that a sovereign could not make preferential payments to any of its creditors whose debt
ranked pari passu with the debt that they held.” Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 
MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1134 (2006). Courts in other nations were subsequently urged to adopt this 
interpretation—which benefited investors at the expense of sovereigns—in litigation with sovereigns
whose debt agreements contained similar language. Id. at 1135. Although this interpretation was viewed
as preposterous by many sovereign debt attorneys, it was subsequently adopted by a number of judges in
the United States. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert C. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in
Commercial Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L.J. 1, 20–21 (2018). While it is certainly possible that this result would 
have occurred regardless of how the Belgian court ruled in the original case, most scholars believe that 
that decision played a role in shaping the decisions rendered by later courts. See, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit &
Jeremiah S. Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, 53 EMORY L.J. 869, 879 (“[T]he
Belgian Court’s decision was significant: the ratable payment interpretation of the pari passu clause had 
been unleashed.”). 
45. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 44, at 1170 (suggesting that the International Swap and
Derivatives Association be consulted as an independent authority to resolve ambiguities in the text of a 
standard swaps contract). When dealing with industry organizations, it is essential that the organization 
in question be truly neutral in its perspective. Deferring to an interpretation proffered by the Insurance 
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and their hired experts in the case at hand. This is because party representations 
are inevitably self-serving; each litigant will argue that its preferred interpretation 
is the one that is favored by the majority of contract users.46 In order to maximize
the likelihood that it will produce a true majoritarian default rule, in short, the 
judge should elicit input from independent sources before rendering an
interpretive decision of first impression that may effectively rewrite the language
in many thousands of private agreements. 
In some cases, this strategy may involve appointing an independent expert to
testify on an interpretive issue.47 In others, it may involve appointing an 
independent attorney or legal organization to file an amicus brief that addresses 
the interpretive question.48 In still others, the courts could look to surveys of 
practicing attorneys or contract users that shed light on how these parties want
ambiguous contract boilerplate to be construed. Omri Ben-Shahar and Lior
Strahilevitz, for example, have conducted surveys of consumers to gain insights 
into how courts should interpret certain provisions in consumer contracts.49 In my
own work, I have conducted surveys of practicing attorneys to gain insights into 
how the courts should interpret dispute-resolution provisions in business 
contracts.50 While such surveys will obviously not be available in every case, these
instruments are arguably a more reliable gauge as to third-party views than the 
representations made by litigants, their experts, or the judge’s own armchair 
intuitions as to meaning of a particular piece of boilerplate.
VI
COUNTERACTING THE NEGATIVE
When the interpretive machinery breaks down, and a court renders an 
interpretive decision that is inconsistent with majoritarian preferences, there are
Services Office, for example, would not be appropriate because this organization principally represents 
insurance companies. 
46. In the litigation relating to the pari passu clause referenced above, for example, the investors 
paid Andreas Lowenfeld, a well-known U.S. professor of international law, to prepare an affidavit in 
support of their interpretation to a Belgian court. Although there was no New York precedent on point, 
and although subsequent research was to reveal that most sovereign debt lawyers profoundly disagreed 
with this interpretation, Professor Lowenfeld’s affidavit “admitted no shard of doubt about either the 
meaning of the pari passu clause in a sovereign debt instrument or its effect on creditor remedies.” 
Buchheit & Pam, supra note 44, at 878. It is probable that an affidavit submitted by an independent expert 
would have offered a more balanced take on this issue. 
47. This action is expressly permitted by the Federal Rules of Evidence, which provide that the 
“court may appoint any expert . . . of its own choosing.” See FED. R. EVID. 706(a). 
48. See Katherine Shaw, Friends of the Court: Evaluating the Supreme Court’s Amicus Invitations, 
101 CORNELL L. REV. 1533, 1548 n.68 (2016) (discussing cases where the Supreme Court has appointed
an amicus curiae “to advance a particular argument, in a case pending before the court” so as to permit
the Court to “decide the case satisfied that the relevant issues have been fully aired”).
 49. See generally Omri Ben-Shahar & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Interpreting Contracts Via Surveys
and Experiments, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1753 (2017). 
50.  See generally Coyle, Canons, supra note 10; Coyle, Interpreting, supra note 23. 
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several ways by which the negative consequences that would otherwise result 
from that decision might be counteracted. First, private parties could contract 
around the decision by redrafting the language in their agreement. This private-
ordering strategy represents the simplest and most straightforward solution to an 
idiosyncratic interpretive decision.51 Like the other strategies discussed in this 
section, however, it imposes costs on private actors that could be avoided if the
courts rendered a decision that conformed to majoritarian expectations in the 
first instance. This private-ordering strategy is also not available to parties who 
are unaware of the original decision.
As an alternative, one might seek to overturn the original decision by 
persuading a subsequent court that the interpretive rule laid down in that 
decision is contrary to the preferences of most contract users.52 This strategy is 
most likely to succeed when there has been some intervening event, such as the 
publication of a new Restatement specifically rejecting the interpretative rule at
issue. New objective evidence, such as a survey showing that the interpretive rule 
is inconsistent with the expectations of a majority of contract users, may also
assist in realizing this goal. In many cases, however, the strategy will fail because 
the new court will invoke the principle of stare decisis and refuse to revisit the
rationale underlying the original decision. 
Third, one could petition the state legislature to enact a statute that preempts 
the original interpretive decision and lays down a new interpretive rule for the 
courts to apply to contracts going forward. While state statutes assigning a 
meaning to particular contract language are not exactly common, neither are they 
unknown. California has enacted a statute that lays down interpretive rules for 
its courts to apply when interpreting contracts of indemnity.53 Virginia has 
enacted a statute directing its courts to construe phrases such as “exclusive 
license” and “all possible rights and for all media” in a specific manner when they
appear in licensing agreements.54 And West Virginia has enacted a statute that
sought to “correct a misinterpretation and misapplication of the law” in a prior 
interpretive decision rendered by that state’s supreme court.55 While this 
particular strategy presents challenges—it is no easy feat to persuade a state
legislature to enact a statute—it represents yet another avenue by which to
counteract flawed interpretive decisions that impose costs on third parties via the 
negative butterfly effect.
51. In the past decade, for example, several universities have redrafted their standard employment 
agreements in response to an adverse interpretive decision rendered by the Federal Circuit involving a 
patent license. See Robert M. Yeh, The Public Paid for the Invention: Who Owns It?, 27 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 453, 468–70 (2012) (discussing Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche 
Molecular Sys., 583 F.3d 832, 841–42 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 
52. See supra notes 35–43 and accompanying text (discussing unsuccessful efforts on the part of
Sterling Boiler to persuade the Tenth Circuit to revisit its earlier interpretive decision).
53.  Cal. Civ. Code § 2778 (West 1872); see also N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 22-02-07 (West 1877). 
54.  Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-503.7(e) (West 2004). 
55.  W. Va. Code Ann. § 33-6-30(c) (West 2002). 
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VII
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SPECIAL ISSUE
Each of the articles prepared for this special issue of Law and Contemporary
Problems grapples with one or more aspects of the butterfly effect described 
above. A brief summary of each contribution appears below.
In Risk-Averse Contract Interpretation, Aditi Bagchi argues that courts should
always take standard market terms into account when interpreting ambiguous 
boilerplate contract language.56 This approach acknowledges the effects that such
decisions have on third parties not involved in the litigation at hand. If courts
look to published prices, formal trade association guidance, and agreements filed 
with the Securities Exchange Commission, then it is much less likely that they 
will interpret a particular word or phrase in a manner that is inconsistent with 
majoritarian expectations. The end result is an interpretive methodology that
maximizes the likelihood that a given decision will generate a positive butterfly 
effect. 
In The Unpredictability of Insurance Interpretation, Michelle Boardman
explores the butterfly effect in the context of insurance contracts.57 She argues, 
first, that insurance companies will sometimes choose not to redraft their
agreements in response to an adverse interpretive decision. In these cases, they 
simply let the negative butterfly effect have its way and charge more for a given 
policy. Second, she argues that sometimes insurers will respond to adverse 
decisions by redrafting their contracts to exclude coverage. Third, and finally, she 
argues that in some cases it may be impossible for insurers to redraft their policies 
in a manner that will satisfactorily address an adverse interpretive decision, 
because there is no practical way to make the language comprehensible to the 
average policyholder. 
In The Butterfly Effect in Interpreting Insurance Policies, Chris French also
explores the butterfly effect in the context of insurance contracts.58 He shows how 
insurance companies strategically decide when—and when not—to litigate in 
order to use the butterfly effect to their advantage. An insurance company may, 
for example, preemptively seek a declaratory judgment in a favorable jurisdiction 
stating that a specific word in a policy has a particular meaning. If the court 
renders a favorable interpretive decision, the insurance company will then invoke 
that decision in future litigation implicating the same policy language. The article 
also discusses how insurance companies redraft sections of their policies in 
response to adverse interpretive decisions in order to negate the butterfly effect 
that would otherwise prove helpful to policyholders in future litigation.
56.  Aditi Bagchi, Risk-Averse Contract Interpretation, 82 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2019, at
1. 
57. Michelle E. Boardman, The Unpredictable Effects of Insurance Interpretation, 82 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2019, at 27. 
58. Christopher C. French, The Butterfly Effect in Interpreting Insurance Policies, 82 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2019, at 47. 
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In Boilerplate No Contest Clauses, David Horton and Reid Weisbord note 
that boilerplate no contest clauses are quite common in wills.59 They discuss a
decision by the California Supreme Court that misinterpreted one of these 
clauses and imposed significant costs on beneficiaries with little in the way of 
corresponding benefit. They then show how a statute enacted by the California 
legislature effectively overruled this decision and established a new interpretive 
default rule that was more in line with majoritarian expectations. This article thus 
serves to highlight the utility of legislative intervention as a potential means of
correcting mistakes when the interpretive machinery for assigning meaning to
boilerplate language breaks down. 
In Boilerplate and Party Intent, Greg Klass argues that it is sometimes 
appropriate to disregard party intent altogether when interpreting contract 
boilerplate.60 When the government mandates that a particular clause be included 
in a certain type of agreement, for example, Klass argues that the government’s 
understanding of the language should always prevail. Similarly, in markets that
require uniform contract terms to operate properly, he argues that courts should
seek to achieve uniformity in contract interpretation and should not concern
themselves overmuch with the intent of the parties. 
In Consumertarian Default Rules, Lior Strahilevitz and Jamie Luguri argue
that courts and legislatures should adopt “consumertarian” default rules.61 A 
consumertarian default rule is a variety of penalty default rule that fills in missing
terms of a contract based on the expectations of consumers writ large. In cases 
involving ambiguous language in contracts between sophisticated and 
unsophisticated entities, for example, the consumertarian approach counsels in 
favor of surveying lay respondents about what the contractual text means and 
adopting the meaning preferred by the majority of consumers where a consensus 
emerges. Once this consumer-friendly interpretation is adopted with respect to a
specific piece of contract boilerplate, the butterfly effect ensures that the 
interpretation will benefit other consumers in future cases. 
In Crisis Construction in Contract Boilerplate, Emily Strauss identifies a
puzzle.62 In mortgage-backed-securities litigation arising out of the financial crisis 
that began in 2008, several courts construed specific pieces of contract boilerplate
in a manner that was flatly inconsistent with the language in these provisions. To 
solve this puzzle, Strauss shows how several early cases involving different 
contracts with different language were construed in a particular way by the 
courts. She then shows how the courts in subsequent cases followed the 
interpretive footsteps of the original court even though the language in the
59. David Horton & Reid Kress Weisbord, Boilerplate No Contest Clauses, 82 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no. 4, 2019, at 69. 
60.  Gregory Klass, Boilerplate and Party Intent, 82 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2019, at 105. 
61. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz & Jamie Luguri, Consumertarian Default Rules, 82 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no. 4, 2019, at 139. 
62. Emily Strauss, Crisis Construction in Contract Boilerplate, 82 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4,
2019, at 163. 
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subsequent contracts was different. In these cases, the butterfly effect was 
powerful enough to impact later interpretive decisions involving contract 
language that bore little resemblance to that in the original cases. 
Finally, in Law, Lawyers, and Self-Governance During the Heyday of the 
London Stock Exchange, Mark Weidemaier explores the sources of friction 
between the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and the English courts in the late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries with respect to the proper 
interpretation of the rules promulgated by the LSE.63 Contracts between brokers 
and customers on the LSE were governed by these rules even though the LSE 
did not promulgate standard-form contracts expressly incorporating them. When 
the English courts were called upon to construe these rules, they occasionally 
rendered interpretations that were inconsistent with those of the trading 
community. In some cases, the LSE undertook to revise its rules to overrule these 
interpretive decisions to avoid a negative butterfly effect. In others, however, 
inertia prevailed and the LSE acquiesced to the interpretive rule announced by 
the courts in order to avoid putting itself into direct conflict with the judiciary. 
Together, these articles showcase the important role that contract boilerplate
plays in contemporary legal practice. In so doing, they provide a compelling 
account of why it is useful to think about the process of interpreting that
boilerplate through this lens. 
63. W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Law, Lawyers, and Self-Governance During the Heyday of the London
Stock Exchange, 82 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2019, at 195. 
